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Abstract
The NPT represents an uneasy compromise between the desire of nuclear weapon States to
halt proliferation of nuclear weapons in other States in order to safeguard their own security,
and the determination of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapon States to reduce and
finally to eliminate nuclear weapons in the world because of their intolerable destructiveness to all
humanity. The newly fashioned review process provides a unique opportunity through which to
resolve this ambiguity in the post-cold war era, where new doctrines must replace old ones as we
enter the twenty-first century.




My closing statement as President of the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference1 ("1995 Conference" or "Conference") of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'
("NPT" or "Treaty") contained the following words on the future
review process:
It is less important to debate about what is legally binding and
what is politically binding. What is more important is that
through delicate and painstaking negotiations the States Par-
ties were able to craft a balanced and forward-looking agree-
ment which they are committed to implement[ing] in a sys-
tematic and progressive manner. They will also periodically
review and evaluate the implementation of the package of
principles and objectives together with the provisions of the
Treaty. This review and evaluation process will be on-going,
regular, and action-oriented. The institutional infrastructure
required to operationalise this process has also been put in
place. All these elements of the agreed [to] package repre-
sent a framework to further the objectives of the Treaty re-
gime, the endurance of which is essential for the future secur-
ity order of the world. The strengthened Review process that
we have established will now ensure a sharper focus on Re-
view Conferences of the future and their Preparatory Com-
mittees. These fora of rigorous accountability will play a
more crucial role in the operation of the Treaty than ever
before. We, as State Parties to the Treaty, have to ensure that
we make maximum use of this mechanism of accountability
* Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United States; President of the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the NPT. The views expressed here are his own. This article
is adapted from a paper presented at an International Seminar held in Kyoto, Japan in
December 1996.
1. See Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, May 11, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 961 (1995) (setting forth results of 1995 Confer-
ence) [hereinafter 1995 Conference]. The 1995 Conference reviewed the 1968 Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5,
1970) [hereinafter NPT].
2. NPT, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729, U.N.T.S. 161.
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in the fulfillment of the undertakings of the Treaty.
3
I. THE NPT & AMBIGUITY
In the immediate aftermath of the 1995 Conference, I con-
cluded that only history will prove whether we had collectively
given the nuclear weapon States a virtual carte-blanche, or
whether we had strengthened the NPT and made a significant
and irreversible step towards nuclear disarmament. It seems il-
logical that a Conference decision achieved without a vote, in-
tending to permanently entrench an international legal norm
against nuclear proliferation, could produce such contradictory
outcomes. The root cause lies in the ambiguity of the NPT itself.
The NPT represents an uneasy compromise between the desire
of nuclear weapon States to halt proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons in other States in order to safeguard their own security, and
the determination of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear
weapon States to reduce and finally to eliminate nuclear weap-
ons in the world because of their intolerable destructiveness to
all humanity. The newly fashioned review process provides a
unique opportunity through which to resolve this ambiguity in
the post-cold war era, where new doctrines must replace old
ones as we enter the twenty-first century.
II. THE ALTERNATIVES
The three carefully interwoven Decisions4 and the Resolu-
tion on the Middle East,5 all adopted without a vote at the con-
clusion of the 1995 Conference, have had a far-reaching impact
beyond the indefinite extension of the NPT. Generally, the 1995
Conference represented the great potential for successful, result-
oriented, multilateral diplomacy which, over the years, has been
viewed with cynical disfavour and which led to the crisis in the
3. U.N. Doc. NPT/Conf.1995/32/pt. III (1995).
4. See 1995 Conference, supra note 1, Annex, at 967-73 (setting forth 1995 Confer-
ence Decisions). Decision 1 governs the strengthening of the review process for the
NPT. Id., Annex, Decision 1, at 968 [hereinafter NPT Review Process Decision]. Deci-
sion 2 governs principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarma-
ment. Id., Annex, Decision 2, at 969-72 [hereinafter Principles and Objectives Deci-
sion]. Decision 3 governs the extension of the NPT on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Id., Annex, Decision 3, at 972-73 [hereinafter NPT Extension Decision].
5. See id., Annex, Resolution on the Middle East, at 973-74 (setting forth 1995 Con-
ference Resolution).
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United Nations today. At a more specific level, the 1995 Confer-
ence ushered in a new era of stringent accountability by the NPT
States in meeting their NPT obligations and the benchmarks set
out in the Declaration of Principles and Objectives For Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.6 The era of stringent ac-
countability begins in April 1997, with the first Preparatory Com-
mittee meeting ("Preparatory Committee Meeting") for the
Sixth NPT Review Conference scheduled for the year 2000. The
first Preparatory Committee Meeting and those that follow it will
be unprecedented and uncharted, and ultimately will amount to
what the NPT parties make of it. Committee members could re-
peat the sterile debates between the nuclear haves and have-
nots, and maybe cover-up the lack of progress in nuclear dis-
armament with skillful drafting, ultimately perpetuating the am-
biguities of the past. Future meetings, on the other hand, could
be a pathbreaking exercise in agenda-setting, strengthening the
NPT in all its aspects on the irreversible road to eliminating nu-
clear weapons in an honest implementation of Article V17 of the
NPT and the politically binding decisions of the 1995 Confer-
ence.
There is an increasing need to align the outcome of the
April 1997 Preparatory Committee Meeting, and indeed the en-
tire NPT Review process of the future, with the explicit intent of
the 1995 Conference's expectations. The 1995 Conference has
been characterized as an indefinite and unconditional extension
of the NPT. Indefinite - yes. Unconditional - most definitely
not. If attempts are made to place self-serving constructions on
the final decisions of the 1995 Conference, I fear the Review pro-
cess is going to be an acrimonious one imperilling the perma-
nence of the NPT. To date, it was the ambiguity of the NPT
provisions and their implementation, including lacuna in the
safeguards system, that led to inconclusive debates of past Review
Conferences, two of which failed to produce a consensus final
document.8 The 1995 Conference may not have eliminated
6. See Principles and Objectives Decision, supra note 4, at 969-72 (setting forth
Principles and Objectives Decision).
7. NPT, supra note 1, art. VI, at 490 (setting forth obligation to negotiate in good
faith and to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects); Principles and Objectives
Decision, supra note 4, at 969-72 (noting 1995 Conference Decision).
8. Both the 1980 and 1990 Conferences failed to produce a consensus final docu-
ment.
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those ambiguities entirely, but it did reduce the ambiguities in
an attempt to reach the ultimate goal of the elimination of nu-
clear weapons.
III. THE REVIEW PROCESS POST 1995
The NPT's twinned responsibilities to halt proliferation and
to achieve nuclear disarmament are not the NPT's only objec-
tives. The Review process, as was decided in 1995, had to be
based on Article VIII(3) of the NPT examining all provisions of
the Treaty.9 Reflecting on the Review process's operations from
1970-95, however, reveals that the NPT Parties made two main
contributions.
The NPT Parties expanded the scope of Preparatory Com-
mittee Meetings beginning in 1997. They converted the Prepar-
atory Committee Meetings into virtual Review Conferences
designed to examine substantive issues in depth. In this exercise
the Principles and Objectives Decision1 ° had special recognition
conferred on it when Preparatory Committee Meetings consid-
ered the implementation of the Treaty.,
The Review exercise was to be both retrospective and pre-
scriptive. The contribution of the German representative in the
Presidential Consultations within the 1995 Conference led to the
formulation of paragraph 7 of the Decision on Strengthening
the Review Process of the Treaty which stated:
The Conference further agreed that Review Conferences
should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the
results of the period they are reviewing, including the imple-
mentation of undertakings of the State [P]arties under the
Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means
through which, further progress should be sought in the fu-
ture. Review Conferences should also address specifically
what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the
Treaty and to achieve its universality.11
These provisions imply that there is decision-making in the
9. See 1995 Conference, supra note 1, at 968 (setting forth agreement to
strengthen review process instituted by Article VIII(3) of NPT); NPT, supra note 1, art
VIII(), at 492 (setting forth plan for periodic review conferences to assure realization
of NPT's purposes and provisions).
10. See Principles and Objectives Decision, supra note 4, at 969-72 (governing prin-
ciples and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament).
11. NPT Review Process Decision, supra note 4, 1 7, at 968.
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Review process. The procedure for this is already set out in the
Rules of Procedure for Review Conferences and Preparatory
Committee meetings. The strengthened Review process must
decide whether these procedures should be adopted. The for-
mat for emb6dying these decisions in the Review process could
be a Report, Declaration, Resolution, or Decision. This depends
on decisions reached in the Review process. There is an urgent
need, therefore, to maximize the use of opportunities for multi-
lateral consultations.
IV. THE NPT RECORD POST 1995
A. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Further clarity in the objectives of the parties to the NPT
has been provided by a number of developments since the 1995
Conference. The Principles and Objectives Decision 12 of the
1995 Conference set out three measures for nuclear disarma-
ment. The first was the completion of negotiation "on a univer-
sal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996." a" Happily that has
not only been achieved, but the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty14 ("CTBT") has actually been signed by 141 countries to
date. It is true that many countries expressed reservations about
many features of the CTBT. It is also true that we may have to
wait indefinitely for the entry into force of the CTBT. But there
is no dispute over the fact that this aspect of the 1995 Confer-
ence has been fulfilled. The other two measures, namely a possi-
ble fissionable material cut-off, and further efforts to reduce nu-
clear weapons, have not been achieved. Developments outside
the NPT process have added weight to the 1995 Conference De-
cisions, however, which the Review process commencing in 1997
cannot ignore.
B. The ICJ Advisory Opinion
The International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") historic Advi-
12. Principles and Objectives Decision, supra note 4, at 969-72.
13. Id. 4(a), at 970.
14. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
1439.
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sory Opinion of July 8, 19965 (the "ICJ Advisory Opinion"), of-
fered the first formal acknowledgment of the applicability of the
Martens clause to nuclear weapons.16 The ICJ Advisory Opinion
stated that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanita-
rian law.""7 To those who dismiss the ICJ Advisory Opinion on
the grounds that it was adopted by "a narrow margin," it must be
recalled that the Court accepted the jurisdiction issue by thir-
teen to one 8 and on the general illegality of nuclear weapons
three of the dissenting judges were clearly of the view that there
should be no exception to the principle of general illegality. 9
Thus, ten judges were of the view that the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons is illegal. Furthermore, and with particular rele-
vance to Article VI of the NPT, the ICJ went on to state "[t] here
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a con-
clusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its as-
pects under strict and effective international control."2"
Pledges to adhere to international law are common-place.
It is now necessary for these pledges to be fulfilled. While the
ICJ "states ... existing law and does not legislate,"2 1 collectively
the ICJ's Advisory Opinions go to form the body of customary
international law that should prevail in international relations,
especially in the post Cold War era. The interpretation of Arti-
cle VI of the NPT has been enlarged by the requirement that
good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament must not only
be conducted, but must also be brought to a successful conclu-
sion. The parties to the NPT will therefore have added reason to
15. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 827-28,
78-87 (July 8, 1996) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion].
16. The Martens Clause is the preamble to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.
See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, pmbl.,
23 Stat. 1803, at 1804-05, 187 Consol. T.S. 429, at 430-31, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 129, at 130-32;
See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, pmbl.
36 Stat. 2277, at 2279-80, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, at 278-79, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90, at 90-92.
17. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, 105(2)(E), at 831.
18. Id. 105(1), at 831.
19. See id. 105(2) (E), at 831 (noting vote of seven to seven, decided by Presi-
dent's casting vote); id. at 878 (Judge Mohamed Shahabudden dissenting); id. at 923
(Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry dissenting); id. at 934 (Judge Abdul G.
Koroma dissenting).
20. Id. 105(2) (F), at 831.
21. Id. 18, at 819.
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insist on the implementation of the two unfulfilled measures in
the Principles and Objectives Decision on nuclear disarmament
of the 1995 Conference.22
C. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
The Canberra Commission,23 of which I was privileged to be
a member, added an influential voice in the attempt to end the
possession of nuclear weapons. Although lacking the same de-
gree of international legal impact, the Canberra Commission
concluded that "[t] his situation is highly discriminatory and thus
unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear
weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to ac-
quire them."24 The conclusion reiterates a well-known theme in
the NPT context, namely that nuclear non-proliferation and nu-
clear disarmament cannot be pursued separately. They are two
faces of the same coin. The Canberra Commission Report, 2 for-
mally presented to the U.N. General Assembly on September 30,
1996 by the Foreign Minister of Australia, identified a series of
steps and practical measures to bring about the verifiable elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons. These could be adopted as an
agenda for action in the NPT Review process perhaps with an
added time frame adopted through consensus decisions.
D. Programme for Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Twenty-eight States presented the Programme for Action
for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons at the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament (the "Programme") on August 7,
1996. The Programme will significantly influence the NPT Re-
view process because many of the co-sponsors are NPT parties.
The Programme sets time frames, and in 1996, introduced a
22. Principles and Objectives Decision, supra note 4, at 969-72 (governing nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament).
23. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was estab-
lished as an independent commission in November 1995 by the then Australian Gov-
ernment. REPORT OF THE CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 3 (1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The Canberra
Commission's goal is to propose practical steps towards a nuclear weapon free world
including the related problem of maintaining stability and security during the transi-
tional period and after this goal is achieved. Id.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id.
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phased program of action to achieve the total elimination of nu-
clear weapons by the year 2020.
Seven new countries have joined the NPT regime since the
1995 Conference, but there remain "states that operate un-
safeguarded nuclear facilities" that have not done so yet. Nor
are there prospects of these States joining anytime soon. Cuba,
for example, has not yet ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 6 Until
these States join, concerns will continue to persist.
Before the outstanding States join the NPT, there will be a
debate on Articles 1 and 2 along with the vexed question of ex-
port controls. The absence of START 1127 ratification and a lack
of meaningful progress on further nuclear arms reduction, how-
ever, together with ominous signs of the designing and deploy-
ment of Ballistic Missile Defence2 1 systems are troubling factors.
No nuclear weapon-state has any published plans for nuclear dis-
armament. Some have advanced new political reasons for retain-
ing nuclear weapons citing fresh dangers to their security. Only
on nuclear weapon-free zones can the post-1995 record be said
to be a positive one. The conclusion of the Pelindaba 29 and
Bangkok Treaties"° are certain to be welcomed, as will the signa-
ture of the Rarotonga Protocols"1 by the United Kingdom,
United States, and France. This will encourage progress in the
more difficult regions of the Middle East and South Asia, while
the Baltic States and other parts of Europe may also begin nego-
tiations. Security assurances continue to be debated and nu-
clear weapon states, with the exception of China, remain unwill-
ing to proceed beyond Security Council Resolution 984.32 It ap-
pears difficult to justify the rejection of a legally binding
26. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14,
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, 6 I.L.M. 521.
27. Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-Rus-
sian Federation, Hein's No. KAV 3526, S. TRAsr Doc. No. 103-1, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
32 (1993).
28. SeeTreaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 (1972) [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. The ABM Treaty defines an
ABM System as a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles, and includes ABM inter-
ceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Id., art. II(1), at 3439.
29. Organization of African Unity- African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 35
I.L.M. 698 (1996).
30. Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635
(1996).
31. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442.
32. See S.C. Res. 984, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 2, S/RES/984 (1995) (discussing
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instrument embodying assurances to non-nuclear weapon states
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, particularly
after the ICJ Advisory Opinion. The Programme for Promoting
Nuclear Non-proliferation's Issue Review No. 733 has a number
of possible options which the 1997 Preparatory Committee Meet-
ing may consider.
Safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are two as-
pects where developments in the International Atomic Energy
Agency34 ("IAEA") will be important. The need for agreement
in the IAEA on enhanced safeguards will be the subject of de-
bate and further development in Vienna before April 1997.
Safeguards on fissile material from destroyed nuclear weapons is
another key issue. Developing countries will continue to seek
more assistance for technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy as required under Article IV of the NPT.35
CONCLUSION
The bridge between 1995, 1997, and beyond, has to be con-
structed carefully if the positive gains of 1995 are to be pre-
served. Ambiguities, compromises, and clever drafting cannot
conceal the failure to achieve the fundamental objectives of the
NPT or to fulfill its political commitments. The indefinite exten-
sion of the NPT in 1995 is much less final than it seems and
should not be taken for granted. Prior to, and during the 1995
Conference, proposals were made to establish a mechanism
within the NPT to hear and decide allegations of non-compli-
ance. This was an alternative to empowering the U.N. Security
Council to do so directly under the all-embracing general rubric
of maintaining international peace and security. The strength-
ened Review Process, with annual meetings of NPT parties be-
ginning in 1997, fulfills this purpose and makes it difficult to
justify direct approaches to the U.N. Security Council which by-
States' promise to abstain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons
states that are parties to NPT).
33. George Bunn & Roland Timerbaev, Security Assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon
States: Possible Options for Change, PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERA-
TION, Issue Review No. 7, Sept. 1996.
34. See NPT, supra note 1, art. III, at 487-89, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172 (establishing IAEA
to monitor peaceful uses of nuclear energy).
35. NPT, supra note 1, art. IV, at 489 (discussing development of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes).
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pass NPT parties without peer recommendations. A caveat,
however, is that parties to the NPT must be able to act purpose-
fully and unitedly if other bodies are not to adjudicate on mat-
ters pertaining to the NPT.
The 1995 Conference had many ingredients for its success
as a multilateral endeavor, including a widespread desire to
avoid voting, conference mechanisms that promoted compro-
mise and consensus, and a number of delegations and individu-
als who played a bridge-building role between groups. There is
no reason why the same ingredients should not be present at the
1997 Preparatory Committee Meeting.
The year of the 1997 Preparatoy Committee Meeting will
have several propitious factors. Many of the industrialized de-
mocracies will have obtained fresh mandates for their govern-
ments. Those democracies could therefore adopt forward look-
ing policies rather than defend the status quo out of a fear of the
polls. The 1995 Conference acted to provide a political boost to
the U.N.-affiliated Conference on Disarmament ("CD") on the
CTBT. The Review process cannot replace the CD, which is the
"leading multilateral disarmament negotiating body," 6 because
it is neither a universal body nor a negotiating one. The Review
process can, however, be supportive of the CD, and shape its
own agenda for the immediate future by achieving a consensus
on specific issues such as strengthening safeguards, achieving a
fissile material cut-off, and other steps in the nuclear disarma-
ment agenda. The 1995 Conference ended positively despite
the discordant notes caused by the failure to have a consensus
Review Declaration, and the statements of the few who reluc-
tantly acquiesced in the Decisions adopted without a vote. 7
The signing of the CTBT in 1996 signified positive momen-
tum despite the reservations of several states. We need to pre-
serve this forward movement among NPT parties. We cannot let
these efforts run aground on differences that were not recon-
ciled by the ambiguous compromise embodied in the NPT.
The Canberra Commission 8 called upon the five nuclear
weapon states to make an unequivocal commitment to eliminate
36. David A. Koplow, Bonehead Non-Proliferation, 17 FLETCHER FORUM 145, 152
(1993).
37. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing 1995 Conference Deci-
sions).
38. See supra note 23 (discussing role of Canberra Commission).
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nuclear weapons, and to start work on practical steps and negoti-
ations for the achievement of this goal. The 1997 Preparatory
Committee Meeting is an ideal opportunity for this commitment
to be made by clarifying the ambiguities in the NPT bargain that
have caused the tensions and pressures within the NPT regime.
It is also an opportunity to make the NPT obligations and polit-
ical commitments credible in a multilateral setting as we begin a
new phase in the history of the NPT.
